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THE SHRINKING ROLE OF THE JURY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
JOHN M. BAKERt
INTRODUCTION
The civil jury is an institution which is guaranteed by the
Constitution,' but which is distrusted when given the task of
deciding constitutional cases. Much of this distrust results
from a fundamental incompatibility between the functions of
constitutional rights and juries. Constitutional rights generally
serve countermajoritarian functions, including the protection
of political minorities from certain oppressive tendencies and
prejudices of popularly elected governments. 2 The jury, by
contrast, is accepted and sometimes defended as a means of
injecting populist norms and standards into the legal process.3
This tension makes it especially important to examine the
control which courts exercise over juries in constitutional
cases. This control may be exercised as judges withhold cases
or issues from the jury prior to trial,4 as courts frame the ques-
tions left to juries in jury instructions, 5 and as courts review a
t John M. Baker is an attorney at Popham, Haik, Schnobrich and Kaufman,
Ltd., a law firm in Minneapolis. B.A., University of Iowa, 1983; J.D., University of
Michigan, 1986.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law."). The United States
Supreme Court has refused to incorporate this provision into the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause and thereby make it applicable to the states. See Walker v.
Sanvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1896). A section 1983 action seeking damages is considered a
"suit at common law" within the meaning of this amendment. See, e.g., Drone v.
Hutto, 565 F.2d 543, 544 (8th Cir. 1977).
2. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962); Choper, The
Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
810, 830-32 (1974).
3. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (juries are "a significant and
reliable objective index of contemporary values"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 519 n. 15 (1968) ("one of the most important functions any jury can perform [in
imposing criminal liability] is to maintain a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system").
4.. See FED. R. Clv. P.. 12, 50(a), 56.
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
1
Baker: The Shrinking Role of the Jury in Constitutional Litigation
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
jury's verdict in post-trial motions and appeals. 6 The greater
the control, the smaller the risk that jury majorities will stymie
the countermajoritarian purposes of constitutional rights.
The purpose of this article is to describe two developments
which have reduced the role juries play in civil constitutional
cases. Neither of these developments result from a direct at-
tempt to counter the majoritarian tendencies of juries. In-
stead, they are rooted in the United States Supreme Court's
inability to reduce constitutional law to coherent rules which
officials can be expected to understand and juries can be ex-
pected to apply. First, the Supreme Court has expanded the
immunity of governmental officials from the burdens of trial in
situations in which their conduct did not violate a clearly estab-
lished constitutional right. 7 Because such immunity is properly
enforceable by the court prior to trial, fewer constitutional
cases reach the jury. Second, the Supreme Court has re-evalu-
ated the distinction between questions of law and questions of
fact in constitutional cases.8 Where a constitutional standard
can be given its proper meaning only when properly applied,
the Supreme Court has indicated that a jury's application of
such standards to undisputed facts can be second-guessed by
judges.
The vast majority of lawsuits raising constitutional questions
are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9 Accordingly, this arti-
cle will focus upon section 1983 litigation, while recognizing
that constitutional litigation in other contexts has influenced
the manner in which courts perceive the jury's role in section
1983 cases. 10
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b), 52(a); See generally FED. R. APP. P. 1-48.
7. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
8. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of -United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
499-500 (1984); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
9. Section 1983 of title 42 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
torn, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for
redress.
This provision originated from section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27,
and wasre-enacted as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
10. The doctrine of independent review of constitutional facts predates the
Supreme Court's rediscovery of section 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961). Thus, many of the most important decisions involving the jury's role in con-
[Vol. 16
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss3/6
ROLE OF JURY
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: FROM QUESTION OF FACT TO
QUESTION OF LAW
A common issue in most constitutional cases is whether indi-
vidual government officials sued in their personal capacities
are immune from liability. In 1982 the Supreme Court reas-
sessed the qualified immunity given to executive officials, and
found that immunity should protect government officials from
insubstantial lawsuits and not simply from liability."t It there-
fore modified its previous standard, which had included an in-
herent jury question, in order to provide a test which it hoped
could be applied prior to trial. As subsequent cases have
demonstrated, qualified immunity is now generally considered
a question of law, 12 which usually can be resolved without any
assistance (or interference) from a jury.
On its face, section 1983 does not provide that any govern-
ment officials will be immune from liability. However, the
Supreme Court has recognized immunities .from section 1983
liability which have no source in the statute's text or legislative
history. 13 The Court's original justification for such immuni-
stitutional cases arose in other contexts, such as judicial review of criminal convic-
tions involving protected activity, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-87 (1927);
convictions violative of equal protection, Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-90
(1935); and civil proceedings impacting upon the defendant's constitutional rights,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964).
11. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 814-18. Municipal officials can become em-
broiled in litigation, despite their personal immunity, if the plaintiff seeks prospective
relief or can state a claim against the municipality itself. See Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (municipality not entitled to official's good faith
immunity). To properly plead a section 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff
must allege that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of an official custom
or policy of the municipality. Owen, 445 U.S. at 633, 657. While such allegations are
commonly pleaded, they seldom survive pre-trial motions in the absence of an ex-
press unconstitutional policy, or evidence of deliberate indifference by the municipal-
ity's final decision makers to a known pattern of unconstitutional conduct. See, e.g.,
Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (8th Cir. 1981).
12. See, e.g., Warren.v. City of Lincoln, 816 F.2d 1254, 1261-62 (8th Cir. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds, 864 F.2d 1436 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc); McIntosh v. Wein-
berger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1432 n.8 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Tur-
ner v. McIntosh, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988). But see Hartley v. Fine, 780 F.2d 1383,
1386-87 (8th Cir. 1986) (Eighth Circuit notes, without criticism, that district court
submitted the issue of qualified immunity to the jury). Somewhat different ap-
proaches to this issue are presented in Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1556 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1577 (1989); Brisk v. City of Miami Beach, 726 F.
Supp. 1305, 1309-15 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
13. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislative immunity);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judicial immunity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
1990]
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ties rested upon the questionable premise that the Reconstruc-
tion Congresses which created section 1983 must have
intended to permit such immunities, at least to the extent they
were available to defendants under the common law of that
era. 14
The Supreme Court has occasionally strayed from that origi-
nal justification, and has crafted certain immunities in order to
advance policy objectives which the Reconstruction Con-
gresses and the nineteenth-century common-law courts may
never have actually considered.' 5 The qualified immunity
given to executive officials has not been shaped by reference to
nineteenth-century common law, but only by reference to
twentieth-century concerns.
Executive immunity is "qualified" in the sense that its availa-
bility depends upon certain special circumstances which can
exist at one moment and not the next. Between the Supreme
Court's 1975 decision in Wood v. Strickland 16 and its 1982 deci-
sion in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,'7 two circumstances were necessary
before executive officials performing discretionary functions
would be immune. Such officials were required to demon-
strate that they acted in subjective good faith (without a "mali-
cious intention") and were further required to show that the
right alleged to have been violated was not a "clearly estab-
lished' right at the time of the alleged violation.' 8 Lower
courts soon recognized that the subjective prong of this test
involved a question of fact. 19 As with many subjective issues,
plaintiffs could easily controvert the official's good faith and
the issue was seldom resolved prior to trial. Thus, qualified
U.S. 232 (1974) (executive. officials' immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976) (prosecutorial immunity).
14. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. For a sophisticated critique of the Court's applica-
tion of the doctrine, see generally Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The
Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741 (1987).
15. 457 U.S. at 815-20; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987)
(admitting that in Harlow, the Supreme Court had "completely reformulated quali-
fied immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law.").
16. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
17. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
18. See, e.g, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (in context of school
discipline action, school board member not liable under section 1983 unless member
"has acted with an impermissible motivation or with .. .disregard of the student's
clearly established constitutional rights").
19. See, e.g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir. 1978).
(Vol. 16
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immunity rarely protected government officials from the bur-
dens of trial.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court found that this
two-part approach permitted too many "insubstantial claims"
to distract public officials.2 0 Accordingly, it eliminated the sub-
jective prong altogether. A key premise for this decision was
the Court's belief that qualified immunity should not simply
protect government officials from ultimate liability, but should
protect them from unwarranted trials, and if possible, discov-
ery prior to such trials. 2' Under the Harlow standard, "govern-
ment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages in so far as their con-
duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."
22
The Supreme Court hoped that the modified immunity stan-
dard could be applied prior to-trial, on a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment.23 When a claim is legally "in-
substantial" and not simply factually insubstantial, the Harlow
standard has generally worked as intended. It has permitted
courts to dismiss novel claims against government officials
prior to trial which previously would have gone to trial because
the plaintiff would have controverted the defendant's subjec-
tive good faith. 4
However, the Harlow standard has been less successful in
protecting government officials from litigating factually insub-
stantial claims. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
been construed to require courts considering motions to dis-
miss and motions for summary judgment to assume the plain-
tiff can prove all pleaded or properly controverted facts.2 5 The
Harlow Court simply directed courts to adopt a "firm applica-
20. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-17.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 818.
23. Id. See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
24. See, e.g., Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1453-54 (8th Cir. 1987).
25. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[A] complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plain-
tiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to re-
lief."); Union Nat'l Bank v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 860 F.2d 847, 854 (8th Cir.
1988) (Summary judgment is inappropriate where the evidence presents "conflicting
rationally possible conclusions.").
1990]
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tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. '26 A right may be
clearly established in the context pled or properly contro-
verted by the plaintiff, but may be novel in the context which is
ultimately established at trial.27 In such cases a court cannot
remain faithful to both the expectations of the Harlow Court
and the Federal Rules.
In 1987 the Supreme Court reinterpreted the Harlow stan-
dard in a manner which made it more difficult for section 1983
plaintiffs to survive a pretrial motion. In Creighton v. City of St.
Paul, plaintiffs alleged they were the victims of an unreasonable
search after local police and at least one FBI agent entered and
searched their home without a warrant in the mistaken belief a
fugitive might be found there.2 8 In U.S. district court, sum-
mary judgment was granted, resulting in dismissal of plaintiffs'
fourth amendment action against the FBI agent. The court
ruled that the agent was entitled to qualified immunity under
Harlow because the warrantless search of the home was
reasonable.29
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the issue of the
lawfulness of the search could not be properly decided on
summary judgment.3 0 The court also held that the agent was
not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds. The court noted that the fourth amendment rights at
issue (i.e., the validity of warrantless searches where elements
of probable cause and exigent circumstances are present) were
clearly established rights. 3 ' The Eighth Circuit refused to con-
26. 457 U.S. at 819-20 n.35 (citation omitted).
27. The most notable examples are cases in which "clearly established law makes
the conduct legal or illegal depending upon the intent with which it is performed."
Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1986). "Because [in Harlow] the
Court did not thereby purge substantive constitutional doctrine of all subjective is-
sues, it did not entirely eliminate subjective inquiry from every qualified immunity
analysis." Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1066 (1985). As the Eighth Circuit has recognized, "motivation is frequently an
issue going to the heart of some lawsuits against public officials, such as civil-rights or
First Amendment actions, and that many cases will present factual questions of moti-
vation incapable of resolution on summary judgment." Wright v. South Ark. Re-
gional Health Center, Inc., 800 F.2d 199, 205 (8th Cir. 1986) (concluding "this is not
such a case"). See generally Balcerzak, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The
Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126, 127 (1975).
28. Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1270-71 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
29. See Creighton, 766 F.2d at 1271.
30. See id. at 1273-75.
31. Id. at 1277. Judge MacLaughlin adopted a similar approach to qualified im-
[Vol. 16
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sider whether those rights had or had not been respected in
the circumstances with which the officer was confronted at the
time. The court proclaimed that these were questions prop-
erly to be decided by the jury on remand. 2
In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that many constitutional rights are meaningful only in a
factual context. Writing for the Court in Anderson v. Creighton,
Justice Scalia noted that every constitutional right is clearly es-
tablished at a very high level of generality.33 The Justice then
added:
But if the test of "clearly established law" were to be ap-
plied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship
to the "objective legal reasonableness" that is the touch-
stone of Harlow. Plaintiff would be able to convert the rule
of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a
rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging viola-
tion of extremely abstract rights.3 4
Justice Scalia clarified the proper interpretation of the term
"clearly established," holding that "the right the official is al-
leged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a
more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The con-
tours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right."'3 5
For government officials, Anderson provides both a blessing
and a curse. The decision precludes plaintiffs from using artful
pleading to deprive government officials of their immunity.
However, by forcing courts to consider immunity in a factual
context, the Anderson decision redirects trial courts to questions
of fact not necessarily resolvable prior to trial.
munity in his first order in the massive "Scott County Cases," stating "[p]laintiffs
assert that they were arrested without probable cause, and this right is beyond ques-
tion." Thus, dismissal on qualified immunity grounds was precluded. See In re Scott
County Master Docket, 618 F. Supp. 1534, 1550 (D. Minn. 1985), rev'd, Myers v.
Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987).
32. See Creighton, 766 F.2d at 1275-77.
33. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987).
34. Id. at 639. Justice Scalia's analysis is strikingly similar to the approach taken
by the Eighth Circuit several months earlier in reversing Judge MacLaughlin's initial
approach to qualified immunity. See Myers, 810 F.2d at 1459 n.16.
35. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. On remand, the district court granted Anderson's
motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, reasoning that An-
derson could reasonably have concluded that probable cause and exigent circum-
stances existed. Creighton v. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654, 660-61 (D. Minn. 1989).
1990]
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The Eighth Circuit has developed a two-step approach to ap-
plying the Anderson test. First, the trial court must determine
whether the law prohibiting the alleged conduct was clearly es-
tablished at the time it occurred. If not, the official is immune,
and no further analysis is necessary.36 According to the Eighth
Circuit, for the second step
a trial court must determine whether the conduct, as alleged
by the plaintiff, constituted actions that a reasonable officer
could have believed lawful. If so, the defendant is entitled
to dismissal prior to discovery. If not, and the parties disagree
as to what actions the police officers took, then discovery may be
necessary before the defendant's motion on qualified immu-
nity can be resolved.3 7
In Ginter v. Stallcup, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that
discovery should occur on the issue of qualified immunity
only if the parties disagree as to what actions the law en-
forcement officers took and if the plaintiff can present some evi-
dence to support her allegations. Mere allegations, without
more, do not create a question of fact as to qualified
immunity.3
8
Thus, the court can resolve the question of immunity prior to
discovery and trial unless the parties present conflicting evi-
dence on a fact upon which a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right depends.
3 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia has taken an additional step designed to permit sum-
36. See Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 1989).
37. Id. at 387-88 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, among others, has ruled that the second step of analysis constitutes a
question for thejury. See Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1556 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1577 (1989) ("Whether a reasonable official would know that she is
violating that clearly established law is a question for the jury."). See also Melear v.
Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989); Brisk v. City of Miami Beach, 726 F.
Supp. 1305, 1309-15 (S.D. Fla. 1989). Instead of submitting special interrogatories
on disputed details material to the court's resolution of this question, these courts
would submit the ultimate issue of immunity to the jury and use "appropriate instruc-
tions" to guard against confusion. See Brisk at 1314-15. Such an approach would
make it easier for section 1983 plaintiffs to frustrate an early resolution of the immu-
nity question. A plaintiff could use vague pleading to survive the first step of the
analysis, and survive the second step by showing that reasonable jurors could differ
about what a reasonable official would know.
38. Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d at 388 (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 426 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[S]ummaryjudg-
ment would not be appropriate if there is a factual dispute.., involving an issue on
which the question of immunity turns, such that it cannot be determined before trial
whether the defendant did acts that violate clearly established rights.").
[Vol. 16
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mary judgment of certain factually insubstantial lawsuits
against officials. In Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep't., a
plaintiff alleged that an otherwise constitutional arrest was un-
constitutional because it was motivated by a desire to deter
him from vindicating his rights. 40 The court held that while
the issue of subjective motivation was, in some contexts, still
relevant after Harlow,'4 1 direct evidence of unconstitutional mo-
tive would be necessary if the case was to proceed to trial."2
Otherwise, the purposes of qualified immunity would be
frustrated.
The "direct evidence" requirement is unlikely to catch on
without the Supreme Court's endorsement. That Court has
acknowledged the difficulties of proving that governmental
conduct was motivated by a discriminatory intent.43 In an era
in which public admissions of racism and sexism are rare, sec-
tion 1983 plaintiffs frequently have little choice but to rely
upon inferences from circumstantial evidence to prove wrong-
ful motivation. Under Martin, however, such cases would be
deemed too "insubstantial" to proceed to trial. It is worth re-
calling that one of section 1983's original purposes was to pro-
vide an effective remedy for victims of racial discrimination by
state and local officials. It would be ironic indeed if one of the
solutions federal courts adopt to prevent abuses of section
1983 frustrates that purpose, while permitting section 1983
claims the Reconstruction Congresses never conceived of to
proceed to trial.
40. 812 F.2d 1425, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The plaintiff was allegedly assaulted
by law enforcement officers during a public demonstration. Subsequent to the as-
sault, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with certain crimes. The plaintiff alleged
that the purpose behind these charges was to deter him from asserting any legal
rights he might have with respect to the assault. See id.
41. See id. at 1431-32.
42. Id. at 1435. See also Poe, 853 F.2d at 432 (adopting Martin's "direct evidence"
requirement in section 1983 gender discrimination action).
43. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 (1977) ("Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evi-
dence of intent as may be available."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)
("Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more
heavily on one race than another.").
1990]
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II. THE INCREASING DOMINANCE OF QUESTIONS OF LAW IN
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In the most simple case, the jury's role is easily understood.
The jury is permitted to render a general verdict as long as the
evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact.44 The jury's
general verdict will ordinarily stand as long as the court pro-
vided the jury with a correct statement of governing law in its
instruction, and any reasonable trier of fact could have reached
the same verdict.45
Two complications arise in constitutional litigation with
some frequency. These complications make it difficult to use
general verdicts and narrow standards of review without com-
promising the values protected by the Constitution.
The first complication arises from the inherent conflict be-
tween constitutional values and jury tendencies. Constitu-
tional rights are commonly countermajoritarian; they exist in
order to limit the power of popularly elected government.4
6
Because jurors are usually selected from the same pool of vot-
ers which elect state and local officials, a danger exists that they
will abuse their discretion to see that the government's ends
are served.47
The Supreme Court is reluctant to presume that any part of
the judicial system is prone to bias. 48 However, on occasion
the Court has been sensitive to this tension. In Monitor Patriot
v. Roy,49 the Supreme Court restricted the jury's authority in a
libel case to determine the relevance of a defamatory statement
to the plaintiff's status as a public figure. The Court explained
that the jury's application of such a standard "is unlikely to be
44. In the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, motions may be made for
summary judgment or directed verdict. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56, 50(a).
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
46. See sources cited supra note 2.
47. See Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F. Supp. 683, 684 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (Permit-
ting jury trial in section 1983 case would produce "the very evil the statute is
designed to prevent .. .the person seeking to vindicate an unpopular right would
never succeed before a jury drawn from a populace mainly opposed to his views.").
As a basis for denying a trial by jury, this rationale did not survive the Supreme
Court's decision in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). See Hildebrand v. Board
of Trustees of Mich. State Univ., 607 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1979).
48. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) ("exceptionally clear
proof" is necessary before the court will infer that a jury abused its discretion in
treating murderers of white victims more harshly than murderers of black victims at
the death penalty stage).
49. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
[Vol. 16
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neutral with respect to the content of speech and holds a real
danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of
those 'vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks' which must be protected if the guarantees of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail."
50
Similarly, jurors' local interests may conflict with national
interests protected by the Constitution. A state which regu-
lates commerce in order to protect local industries and busi-
nesses may violate the dormant commerce clause 5' if the
protections afforded by the regulation come at the expense of
out-of-state industry.52 A jury drawn from the population of
the regulating state, and empaneled to decide an underlying
fact issue in commerce clause litigation, may have no interest
in frustrating such protectionism.
The second complication arises from the impossibility of ad-
equately capturing the full meaning of many constitutional
principles injury instructions. On rare occasions, the Supreme
Court reduces its constitutional analysis to a coherent rule
which a jury can be trusted to apply.53 With increasing fre-
quency, however, the Court has been unable or unwilling to
settle on a rule. Instead, it has chosen to adopt a case-by-case
approach or a mode of analysis which is meaningful only in its
application to a specific context. 54 In theory, it may be possi-
ble to quote the Court's test in an instruction and hope that
the jury's application of it will reflect the interests and values
which the Supreme Court had in mind. In practice, however,
something will be lost in the translation.
50. Id. at 277 (citation omitted).
51. When a state enacts regulations governing an aspect of commerce, those reg-
ulations may conflict with Congress' power under the commerce clause in article I,
section 8, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution. This conflict may occur even if Congress
has enacted no regulations of its own in the particular area of commerce. The "dor-
mant commerce clause" is a reference to a court's interpretation of congressional
"silence" in an area of commerce. For a discussion, seeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8.1-8.5 (3d ed. 1986).
52. See generally Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
53. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
54. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (balancing test for
determining how much process is "due"); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) ("compelling interest" analysis of affirmative action); Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) ("content-neutrality" analy-
sis); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968) (balancing test for em-
ployee speech); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (four-part
analysis of justifications for regulating expressive conduct).
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For decades, the Supreme Court's approach to the law-fact
distinction in constitutional cases has been somewhat inconsis-
tent, and certainly incomplete. On several occasions, the
Court simply treated factual findings in constitutional cases in
the same manner as factual findings in non-constitutional
cases. 55 However, in other decisions, the Supreme Court has
abandoned its usual deference to factual findings (usually la-
beled as "mixed questions of law and fact") in reliance on a
purported obligation to conduct an "independent examination
of the whole record ' 5 6 in order to ensure that the Constitution
has been properly applied.
In 1984 in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. ,58
the Supreme Court attempted to synthesize these two lines of
cases into a coherent doctrine. In Bose, a manufacturer of
unique stereo loudspeakers brought a product disparagement
suit against a leading consumer magazine which had given its
product a mixed review. On appeal from a trial court's judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff, a critical question was whether
the magazine's reviewer acted with actual malice when he
wrote that the "individual instruments heard through the Bose
system.., tended to wander about the room." 59 The reviewer
had admitted at trial that the instruments merely wandered
along the wall.6" The First Circuit did not defer to the trial
court's finding of actual malice.61 Instead, it performed a "de
novo review, independently examining the record to ensure
that the district court has applied properly the governing con-
stitutional law and that the plaintiff has indeed satisfied its bur-
den of proof."' 62 Unable to find clear and convincing evidence
that the magazine published the statement with knowledge that
55. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 720-21 (1985); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 256 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
57. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933-34 (1982); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 52 (1949); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946); Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670-71 (1944).
58. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
59. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249,
1264 (D. Mass. 1981), cert. granted, 461 U.S. 904 (1983), aft'd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
60. Id. at 1276-77.
61. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 195
(1st Cir. 1982).
62. Id.
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it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not, the First Circuit reversed the judgment.
The plaintiff understandably could complain that the court
of appeals had invaded the factfinder's province. The First
Circuit had second-guessed a finding about what the reviewer
actually knew. The factfinder's determination of actual knowl-
edge was based in large part upon an evaluation of the de-
meanor of the reviewer on the witness stand.63 The court of
appeals' scrutiny seemed inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's prior description of the question of actual malice. In
Herbert v. Lando, the question of actual malice had been de-
scribed by the Court as a qhestion of "ultimate fact."'  If the
finding in Bose could be subjected to de novo review, would
any finding of fact in a constitutional case be safe?
By six-to-three vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the First
Circuit's decision. 65 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
acknowledged that "two well-settled and respected rules of law
point in opposite directions."' 66 On the one hand, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) mandated a "clearly erroneous"
standard of review for findings of fact, and "it surely does not
stretch the language of the Rule to characterize an inquiry into
what a person knew at a given point in time as a question of
'fact.' ",67 However, the rule of independent review, which the
Supreme Court itself had invoked repeatedly in first amend-
ment cases, could not be ignored.
Justice Stevens avoided the obstacle of Rule 52(a) in a famil-
iar manner, by implicitly framing the Court's task as an applica-
tion of the fact-law distinction.68 His analysis focused upon
three characteristics of the "actual malice" requirement which
made independent review justifiable from a historical and con-
stitutional perspective. 69 First, the "actual malice" require-
ment was derived from common-law standards which allow the
judge the maximum of power in passingjudgment in a particu-
63. Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1276-77.
64. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979).
65. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514
(1984).
66. Id. at 498.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 501.
69. Id. at 502-03.
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lar case. 70 Second, "the content of the rule is not revealed sim-
ply by its literal text, but rather is given meaning through the
evolutionary process of common-law adjudication." '7 1 Justice
Stevens added that the Supreme Court's "role in marking out
the limits of the [actual malice] standard through the process
of case-by-case adjudication is of special importance.' '72
Third, "the constitutional values protected by the [actual mal-
ice] rule make it imperative that judges-and in some cases
judges of this Court-make sure that it is correctly applied."7 3
In explaining these factors,Justice Stevens left no doubt that
his analysis should apply with equal force to jury verdicts. 4
Indeed, the Supreme Court had already exercised independent
review of evidence supporting jury verdicts in cases such as
Fiske v. Kansas,75 New York Times v. Sullivan,76 and Jenkins v. Geor-
gia.7 Moreover, two of the judges dissenting in Bose viewed
jury verdicts with more suspicion than the findings of a
judge.78
On its face, the holding in Bose and its reasoning were lim-
ited to first amendment cases. However, the doctrine of in-
dependent review had been applied outside of the first
amendment long before Bose,79 and it was not apparent why
Justice Stevens's broad justification of independent review
should be limited to a single constitutional amendment.8 0
Moreover, the Court's extension of independent review to a
state-of-mind issue raised concerns that verdicts on similar is-
sues-such as discriminatory intent-would now be subject to
de novo review.
70. See id. at 502.
71. Id. at 502.
72. Id. at 503.
73. Id. at 502.
74. Id. at 501 ("[T]he rule of independent review assigns to judges a constitu-
tional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact, whether the factfind-
ing function can be performed in the particular case by a jury or by a trial judge.").
75. 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927) (involving a criminal conviction for union activity).
76. 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964) (involving a civil defamation action).
77. 418 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1974) (involving a jury verdict that an R-rated movie
was obscene).
78. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 518 n.2 (Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) ("The
factfinding process engaged in by a jury rendering a general verdict is much less
evident to the naked eye and thus more suspect than the factfinding process engaged
in by a trial judge who makes written findings as here.").
79. See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
80. See Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 264-68
(1985).
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In three subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has re-
fused to extend its approach in Bose to other treatments of con-
stitutional facts. In Miller v. Fenton, the Supreme Court was
asked to reconsider its previous decisions holding that the vol-
untariness of a confession is a question of law requiring in-
dependent federal determination in habeas corpus cases."'
The Court engaged in a re-examination of the fact-law distinc-
tion, adopting a central tenet of Bose while acknowledging limi-
tations on its scope. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor
(a dissenter in Bose) embraced a key precept of Bose:
Where... the relevant legal principle can be given meaning
only through its application to the particular circumstances
of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give the tiier of
fact's conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing, strip
a federal appellate court of its primary function as an expos-
itor of law.8
2
However, Justice O'Connor was equally respectful of the value
of deference where "the issue involves the credibility of wit-
nesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of de-
meanor."83 Accordingly, she left no doubt that answers to
"subsidiary questions such as the length and circumstances of
the interrogation," are entitled to a presumption of correct-
814ness on review.
The Court, relying on three propositions, treated the ulti-
mate issue of voluntariness as a question of law. First, the
Court reasoned that voluntariness analysis required an evalua-
tion of whether the techniques used to extract the confession
were compatible with due process values.8 5 Second, the Court
noted that "assessments of credibility and demeanor [were]
not crucial" to the resolution of the voluntariness issue.8 6 Fi-
nally, "independent federal review has traditionally played an
important parallel role in protecting the rights at stake."8 "
In Maine v. Taylor,8 a dormant commerce clause case, the
Supreme Court reversed a decision of the First Circuit, which
81. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
82. Id. at 114 (citing Bose, 466 U.S. at 503).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 117.
85. Id. at 116.
86. Id. at 116-17.
87. Id. at 117-18.
88. 477 U.S. 131, 144-45 (1986).
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had conducted an independent review of the trial court's find-
ing that a less discriminatory alternative to the state regulation
was not available. With only a passing reference to Bose, the
Supreme Court stated in broad terms that "appellate courts
are not to decide factual questions de novo, reversing any find-
ings they would have made differently."-8 9 Because the Court
viewed the availability of alternative means as an empirical
question, it had little difficulty explaining its reversal. 90
More recently, the Supreme Court considered the proper
application of Bose following a jury trial, where proof of actual
malice was heavily dependent upon credibility determinations.
In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,91 the Court
preserved the trier of fact's discretion to evaluate the credibil-
ity of witnesses and resolve subsidiary factual disputes. Justice
Stevens, again writing for the majority, denied that the Bose de-
cision authorized an invasion of the trier of fact's province. 9
2
While the jury's credibility determinations would be entitled to
deference, the ultimate finding of actual malice remained sub-
ject to independent review.93
Unfortunately, however, the case was not submitted to the
jury in a matter designed to facilitate this mixture of deference
and independent review. The jury was asked to reach a verdict
on the ultimate issue of actual malice, and was not asked to
answer any special interrogatories concerning any of the "sub-
sidiary facts" or the credibility of testimony.9 4 However, the
Supreme Court deduced from the jury's response and the un-
disputed evidence that the jury must have rejected the only tes-
timony controverting actual malice.95
These decisions reflect a division of labor in constitutional
cases which is easy to defend but difficult to apply. The review-
ing court must now scrutinize the record closely enough to en-
sure that the trier of fact has given the proper meaning to the
constitutional standards involved. 96 In so doing, however, it
must not judge the credibility of witnesses and cannot second-
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
92. Id. at 2696 n.35.
93. Id. at 2695.
94. Id. at 2682 n.2.
95. Id. at 2697.
96. Bose, 466 U.S. at 505.
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guess findings of so-called subsidiary facts.97
Under a careful application of Bose, the role of the jury will
be limited to deciding "what happened, ' 98 if a genuine dispute
exists about what happened and a resolution of that dispute is
material to the outcome of the case. For example, in a case
involving the presence of probable cause for an arrest, a trial
may be necessary to decide which witnesses' description of cir-
cumstances leading to the arrest is accurate. However, under
Bose, the evaluation of those circumstances to determine
whether they provided the officer with a sufficient justification
for the arrest should not be left to thejury. Such an evaluation
is the process through which the constitutional standard of
probable cause is given meaning.99
The Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit appear to have
adopted this approach. In New Jersey v. T.L.0., the Supreme
Court reviewed a state court's ruling that a teacher lacked rea-
sonable grounds to search a student's purse for cigarettes.' 0 0
The Supreme Court recognized that the "reasonable grounds"
standard applied by the state court was not substantially differ-
ent from the proper standard.'0 ' However, its own review of
the facts surrounding the search led the Supreme Court to
conclude that the search was reasonable.
0 2
In Warren v. City of Lincoln, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reviewed a section 1983 claim brought by an attempted bur-
glary suspect against three police officers and the municipality
which employed them. 0 3 At trial, two of the officers testified
that they believed they lacked probable cause to arrest the
plaintiff for attempted burglary, but persuaded the jury to find
in their favor nevertheless. 1°4 The majority of the Eighth Cir-
cuit's judges concluded that probable cause not only existed
97. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 117 (1985).
98. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 80, at 235.
99. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1982) (in criminal investigation context,
magistrate applies constitutional standards to totality of the circumstances in order to
determine existence of probable cause necessary for issuance of search warrant). See
also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 (1949) ([T]he term " 'issue of fact' ... does not
cover a conclusion drawn from uncontroverted happenings, when that conclusion
incorporates standards of conduct or criteria for judgment which in themselves are
decisive of constitutional rights.").
100. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1982).
101. Id. at 343.
102. Id.
103. Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1437 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
104. Id. at 1439.
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but existed as a matter of law. Rejecting the arguments of four
dissenting judges who insisted that a jury must decide whether
probable cause existed, the majority reviewed the uncontro-
verted facts which were within the offiters' knowledge, com-
pared those facts to other cases in which probable cause
existed, and affirmed the judgment. 105
In an excessive force case, a similar application of Bose would
limit the jury's province to a resolution of any dispute concern-
ing the circumstances in which force was used. An evaluation
of whether the force used was too much force under those cir-
cumstances arguably should be decided by the court.'0 6 How-
ever, this approach is hardly popular. Many courts continue to
permit juries to decide whether force was constitutionally ex-
cessive, and reverse judges who interfere with that decision.1
0 7
In other section 1983 cases, there are relatively few material
underlying facts. Where the constitutionality of a law or regu-
lation depends upon the adequacy of the government's justifi-
cation, for example, the credibility of witnesses is largely
beside the point.10  Thus, in cases involving the constitution-
ality of local sign ordinances, reviewing courts have shown no
deference to the trial court's conclusion that the ordinance di-
rectly advances the city's interest, and is not more extensive
than necessary.t°9
In the area of prisoners' rights, the Supreme Court has now
required courts to focus almost exclusively on the govern-
ment's justification for its conduct, without reaching the empir-
ical question of whether a less restrictive means was in fact
105. Id. at 1440-42.
106. As Professor Nahmod recently noted, "[olne result of this movement toward
'objectiveness' is that with respect to excessive force and qualified immunity issues,
the role of the jury has been considerably diminished, if not altogether eliminated."
S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHrs AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF § 1983,
§ 3.04, p.8 0 (2d ed. Supp. 1989).
107. See, e.g., Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (Jury should
be instructed that it could find in favor of plaintiff if it believed his testimony and if it
was persuaded that the conduct of defendant was not objectively reasonable in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting him.). See also Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d
1363, 1371-72 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he alleged use of excessive force is generally an
issue of fact.").
108. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 563-66 (1980); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
109. See Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1107-09 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829
F.2d 1051, 1053 n.9 (Ilth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
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available. In its 1987 decision in Safley v. Turner, the Court ap-
peared to reduce the constitutional rights of prisoners down to
a single rule: prison regulations infringing on inmates' consti-
tutional rights are valid if reasonably related to legitimate pe-
nological interests."t 0 As the Court demonstrated in Safley,
government officials can satisfy this step by drawing a logical
connection for the court, whether or not that connection is
well-grounded in fact. ' Because the Safley officials' explanation
for an inter-prison correspondence regulation was satisfactory,
the Court did not inquire further. In such cases a jury seems
largely unnecessary.
The Supreme Court's commitment to the principles set forth
in Bose will be severely tested when a section 1983 plaintiff asks
for independent review of a verdict -on the issue of unconstitu-
tional motivation. Prior to Bose, the Supreme Court firmly re-
versed the Fifth Circuit's longstanding practice of
independently reviewing findings of discriminatory intent in
Title VII cases."l 2 One year after Bose, it unanimously reaf-
firmed this position, without a single reference to Bose., 3 Its
ruling in Pullman-Standard v. Swint was based in part upon the
Supreme Court's use of a "clearly erroneous" standard of re-
view on the issue of intentional segregation in the 1979 deci-
sion in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman." 4 In each case,
however, the Court did little more than label questions of in-
tent as "pure questions of fact"-an approach which should
have compelled a different result in Bose.
Independent review of the record where racial discrimina-
tion is- alleged is hardly new; the Supreme Court exercised it in
Norris v. Alabama to reverse a conviction in the notorious
"Scottsboro Boys" case." 5 Indeed, the risk of majoritarian
bias makes routine deference to a jury's verdict on this issue
110. 428 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Thejudges of the Eighth Circuit have been engaging
in an on-going battle over the degree of deference which should be given to the trial
court's findings in prisoner Section 1983 actions. Compare Hill v. Blackwell, 774 F.2d
338, 343 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he ultimate conclusion as to constitutionality is a ques-
tion of law.") with Goffv. Nix, 809 F.2d 530, 531 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, J., dissenting)
("Selective reliance on Anderson v. City of Bessemer City converts the clearly erroneous
rule into a doctrine of convenience for the reviewing court.").
111. Safley, 428 U.S. at 93-95 n.*.
112. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291-93 (1982).
113. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 571-81 (1985).
114. 433 U.S. 406, 416 (1977).
115. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935).
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especially difficult to defend. While credibility determinations
can play an important role in discrimination cases, they are no
more important than in cases such as Bose involving actual
malice.
The most significant difference between actual malice and
discriminatory intent lies in the ease with which the constitu-
tional standard can be captured in a rule. While the full mean-
ing of actual malice has developed on an ad hoc basis through
its application in various contexts, the notion of intentional
discrimination has not. At most, the Supreme Court has enu-
merated the kinds of evidence which can or cannot support an
inference of discriminatory motive." t 6 Such guidance can be
more easily provided to a jury.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to overstate the significance of whether a judge or
jury wields primary authority in constitutional litigation.
Judges, like jurors, can be prone to localism, and may reflect
the same biases and prejudices as the jury pool. A judge's
sense of how much force is too much force, or what a reason-
able police officer would know about citizens' rights, is as likely
to reflect his or her own background as it is to result from a
scholarly interpretation of what the Constitution means.
The greatest benefits of a diminished jury role are subtle,
but important. Absent a settlement, only a judge can bring a
case to an end prior to the close of evidence. As the Supreme
Court recognized in Harlow, public officials should be pro-
tected from the burdens of trial (and discovery, if possible) on
insubstantial claims. A proper application of Harlow and Bose
should permit judges to reach the merits and immunity de-
fenses in many constitutional cases at an earlier stage, so long
as no genuine disputes exist about what happened.
The Bose decision should also make the Constitution less
mysterious to officials whose responsibilities require them to
anticipate how it will be enforced. A judge can apply a consti-
tutional standard by comparing the case before him to previ-
ous cases. Officials can thus anticipate how a court might rule
by looking for factually analogous cases prior to taking action.
116. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S: 252, 266 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
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Any issues which may arise about the constitutionality of such
actions can then be resolved by reference to the same
decisions.
However, such arguments by analogy cannot be made to a
jury. Because jurors cannot know how the standard was ap-
plied in other cases, the same standard can be applied in iden-
tical cases with opposite results. The shrinking role of the jury
diminishes the risk that the Constitution will be applied in con-
tradictory or inconsistent ways, by placing the task in the hands
of ajudge. As constitutional application becomes more consis-
tent, it will become more predictable, and fewer violations
should occur.
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